The main goal of this work is to systematize this knowledge. Further, our understanding of adversaries, the underlying storage technologies, as well as the available plausible deniable solutions have evolved dramatically in the past two decades. Careful analyses often uncover not only high overheads but also outright security compromise. Unfortunately, these efforts have often operated under less well-defined assumptions and adversarial models. Popular encrypted storage systems such as TrueCrypt and other research efforts have attempted to also provide plausible deniability. Plausible deniability (PD) is a powerful property, enabling users to hide the existence of sensitive information in a system under direct inspection by adversaries. Increasingly-intrusive anti-encryption laws severely limit the ability of standard encryption to protect privacy. Unfortunately, it is under continuous attack by overreaching or outright oppressive governments, including some of the world's oldest democracies. This work is meant also as a trusted guide for system and security practitioners around the major challenges in understanding, designing and implementing plausible deniability into new or existing systems.ĭata privacy is critical in instilling trust and empowering the societal pacts of modern technology-driven democracies. It aims to: (1) identify key PD properties, requirements and approaches (2) present a direly-needed unified framework for evaluating security and performance (3) explore the challenges arising from the critical interplay between PD and modern system layered stacks (4) propose a new “trace-oriented” PD paradigm, able to decouple security guarantees from the underlying systems and thus ensure a higher level of flexibility and security independent of the technology stack. Unfortunately it is under continuous attack by overreaching or outright oppressive governments, including some of the world’s oldest democracies. We have completed an implementation on Linux, and experiment results confirm that StegFS achieves an order of magnitude improvements in performance and/or space utilization over the existing schemes.ĭata privacy is critical in instilling trust and empowering the societal pacts of modern technology-driven democracies. Unlike previous steganographic schemes, our construction satisfies the prerequisites of a practical file system in ensuring integrity of the files and maintaining efficient space utilization. StegFS securely hides user-selected files in a file system so that, without the corresponding access keys, an attacker would not be able to deduce their existence, even if the attacker is thoroughly familiar with the implementation of the file system and has gained full access to it. We introduce StegFS, a steganographic file system that aims to overcome that weakness by offering plausible deniability to owners of protected files. While user access control and encryption can protect valuable data from passive observers, those techniques leave visible ciphertexts that are likely to alert an active adversary to the existence of the data, who can then compel an authorized user to disclose it.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |